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EXPLORING CHALLENGES WITH THE
DISCOVERY OF TEXT MESSAGES IN FEDERAL
CASES THROUGH THE LENS OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11
I. INTRODUCTION
Abco, Inc. ("Abco") is suing Allen Dean ("Dean") in United States
District Court for misappropriation of trade secrets based on text messages
that Dean sent to Abco's lead competitor, Banes, Inc. ("Banes"). Dean
exchanged sensitive information with Banes employees on his companyowned cell phone on nearly a dozen occasions. Dean's counsel moved to
enjoin both Banes' and Abco's requests for text message data based on the
Stored Communications Act ("SCA") and his Fourth Amendment rights.
Dean's cellular service provider, Sprintel, Inc., refuses to release any of the
text message data in response to Banes' and Abco's discovery requests.
Both Abco and Banes have filed motions to compel release of the text
message data based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules"); the
text message data is critical to all parties' claims.
This hypothetical case illustrates the complex party dynamics in
the discovery of text messages and pager data. This note explores federal
civil cases with similar text message and pager data discovery issues with a
focus on the interplay between constitutional claims, federal law, and the
Rules.
In 2009, as compared to twenty years ago, almost all stored
information and communications are electronic; this shift complicates the
scope of electronic discovery.'
Widely accepted yet vague standards
determine discovery rules for electronically stored data such as the raw text
message data from cell phones and pagers.2 Fourth Amendment challenges

See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note (2006) (basing amendments to Rules
on need for clarification amidst "dramatic" surge in electronic information); see generally David
K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primerfor Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 1.1 (2005)
(asserting over 99% of information "created and stored is stored electronically"). Furthermore,
the increased use of electronic information and communications has precipitated the need for
additional clarity as to what constitutes a "document" under the Rules. Id. at II.A. 1-3.
2 See Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the ProposedFederalE-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 13, 13 (2006), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vl2i4/articlel3.pdf (stating
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are common in electronic discovery disputes and the criteria for
determining the permissibility of certain types of electronic discovery are
laid out in a handful of federal cases.3 Though courts and legislatures have
provided a modicum of guidance on issues of electronic discovery, many
ambiguities remain..4
Text messages 5 are a relatively new application area for the Rules,
and thus few courts have explicitly defined the standards for producing text
messages.6 The Rules were revised in 2006 to provide courts with more
direction on issues of electronic discovery including metadata and
electronic media that are dramatically altering the landscape of electronic
discovery.7 Among other goals, the revisions to the Rules sought to

standard for preserving and identifying electronic information requires "reasonable and good faith
efforts") (quoting The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles: Best Practices
Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production (2005)).
Nevertheless, requiring parties to preserve all electronic information based on potential relevance
is unreasonable. Id.
3 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (6-1 decision) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(establishing "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether physical or electronic
"intrusion" violated Fourth Amendment); see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 731-32
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating Katz analysis to find against hospital employee
alleging privacy violation). The majority in O'Connoragreed with Justice Scalia's application of
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. Id. at 717-18 (majority opinion). See
generally Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 977, 977 (2008) (noting Katz test has evolved into "the touchstone of Fourth Amendment
analysis"); William A. Herbert, The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You Must he
Honest, 12 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 49, 58 (2008) (citing O'Connor,480 U.S. at 717)
(setting forth scope of employees' "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the workplace).
4 See Ideal Aerosmith, Inc. v. Acutronic USA, Inc., No. 07-1029, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33463, at *8-9 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2008) (illustrating lack of relevant case law regarding SCA.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2008) and electronic
discovery). But see Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2008)
(employing well-defined criteria to hold text message data on police officers' pagers not
discoverable). The Ninth Circuit relied on the Fourth Amendment and the SCA to evaluate the
discoverability of the text message data. Id. at 901-02, 905.
5 For the purposes of this article, a text message is a message "that is entered via a keypad
rather than spoken into a receiver," excluding e-mail and other communications via computers.
Robin Miller, Annotation, Expectation of Privacy in Text Transmissions to or fiom Pager
Cellular Telephone. or Other Wireless PersonalCommunications Device, 25 A.L.R. 6TH 201, § 1
(2007).
6 See Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232-33, 1237 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding text
messages sent by employees from City pagers and stored within City's database are
discoverable); see also Quon, 529 F.3d at 904-06 (concluding audit of police officers' text data
improperly violated officers' reasonable expectation of privacy); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252
F.R.D. 346, 347 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (ruling magistrate judge could properly examine text message
evidence in camera based on Rule 34); Ideal Aerosmith, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33463, at *8-9
(noting dearth of definitive case law interpreting SCA).
7 See Isom, supra note 1, at
1.3, II.T.2 (arguing 2006 Rules revisions purport to provide
additional guidance for electronic discovery).
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specifically address both printed and electronic media s Increasingly,
accessibility and availability of electronic information have become the
central grounds for objections to discovery requests.) Moreover, the rapid
evolution of electronic communication and retrieval methods has revealed
new frontiers of discovery, such as text messages and pager data.'0
This note argues that advances in technology increasingly require
judges to craft new approaches to discovery issues regarding text message
and pager data, and that judges often inject a great deal of public policy
reasoning into their holdings. "1 Rules 26, 34, and 45 emphasize a
pragmatic, liberal approach to discovery, yet these rules alone are
2
inadequate to create consistent electronic discovery practices.
Furthermore, the SCA 13 adds another level of complexity to text message
discoverability that exacerbates case law inconsistencies because of its
vague standards for electronic communication systems ("ECS") and remote
computing services ("RCS").1 4 These hazy layers of discovery rules and
federal statutes have created a patch-work of precedent that is often too
fact-specific to provide guidance for future cases.' 5 Ultimately, the
jurisprudence regarding the discoverability of text messages will likely
become more cohesive as new cases emerge to clarify the myriad
6
ambiguities that currently plague this area of law.'

FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note (2006) (asserting 2006 amendments
equalize applicability of Rules to electronic and paper documents); see also Scotts Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *4-5 (S.D. Ohio June 12,
2007) (relying on amended Rules to find plaintiff equally entitled to access to electronic and
paper documents).
See Allman, supra note 2, at 17-18 (arguing Advisory Committee took middle ground by
permitting parties to specify electronic or paper production medium).
10 See The Litigator's Secret Weapon: ONSITE3's DXR Software, METROTROPOLITAN
CORPORATE

COUNS.,

Jan.

2007,

at

35,

available

at

http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/January/35.pdf (indicating improvements in optical
scan and electronic data recovery facilitate review of text message data).
I See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (summarizing standards for employee
privacy and noting jurisdictional inconsistencies); see also Isom, supra note 1,
ll.k.1
(emphasizing judges' discretion in developing electronic discovery rules based on fairness and
efficiency).
2 See izi'a Part 1I (discussing relevant discovery requirements in Rules 26, 34, and 45, and
SCA defenses to discovery).
I Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-11 (2008) (providing requisite conditions for service providers responding to requests for
release of electronic information).
14 See inltra Parts Il-Ill (discussing effect of relevant Rules and SCA on discoverability of
text messages).
15 See inta Part IV (analyzing application of Rules and SCA within context of text message
discovery).
16 See infi'a Part V (predicting forthcoming clarity in electronic discovery issues).
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II. HISTORY
Though many of the Rules are relevant to the discovery of
electronic information, Rules 26, 34, and 45 specifically apply to electronic
discovery issues.' 7 Rule 26(b)(1) defines the scope of discovery and
provides broad standards for courts granting discovery motions. 8 Some of
the impetuses in amending the Rules in 2006 were to increase accessibility,
to lower the cost of discovering electronic materials, and to clarify
ambiguities with respect to privilege and waiver.' 9 Generally, Rule 26
gives trial courts substantial latitude in deciding whether a discovery
request constitutes an undue burden that would justify non-production.2 °
Rule 26 also lays out the general interpretative approach to other Rules,
which were amended in 2006, in part to address the legal community's
imploration for guidance. 2' Rule 34 provides specific guidance factors that
a court must employ when adjudicating electronic discovery disputes. 22

17

See Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil

Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REv. 327, 342 (2000) (asserting Rules 26-37 lay
foundation for modem discovery process). These Rules render trials "a search for truth rather
than a battle of wits." Id.; see also Isom, supra note 1,at I II.T.2 (2005) (explaining amended
Rule 45 allows litigants to subpoena third parties for electronic discovery).
18 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.");
see also Modem Eng'g, Inc., v. Peterson, No. 07-CV-1055, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5113 1,*1-2,
7-8 (C.D. Ill. July 16, 2007) (granting plaintiff's motion to compel production of transmitted
information including text messages under defendant's control). The district court reasoned that
the "care, custody, and control" standard is the proper production criteria and cited Moore's
Federal Practice as the definitive approach to determining control. Id.at *6-7.
19 See Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the FederalRules, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 321,
331 (2008) (observing "major shift" in corporate attitudes towards electronic discovery and
Advisory Committee's willingness to provide concrete guidance). Since 2000, the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee has made recommendations on electronic discovery and preservation
policies in piecemeal fashion. Id. at 331-33.
20 See Modern Engg, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51131, at *2-3 (citing Packman v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 646 (7th Cir. 2001)) ("District Courts have broad discretion in
discovery matters.").
21 See generally Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 17, at 329, 341 (summarizing Rule
26(b)(I) as defining scope of discovery and predicting surge in electronic discovery disputes).
22 See FED R. Civ. P. 34. The Rules provide well-enumerated standards for complying with
document requests, as evidenced in Rule 34(a), which states, in relevant part:
(a) A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b):
(1)to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect,
copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party's possession,
custody, or control:
(A) any designated documents or electronically stored information-including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound
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This rule requires the responding party to search and produce electronic
information in some form, but does not necessarily allow the requesting
party to conduct the actual search of the relevant data.23 Moreover, the
complexity of electronic discovery issues and the interplay between Rules
26 and 34 have incited some courts to craft novel responses to a requesting
party's motion to compel discovery, such as allowing a qualified third party
to inspect the data.2 4 Many courts have declined to accept the premise that
requests for electronic data constitute an unreasonable burden on the5
2
producing party and have required each party to substantiate its claims.
recordings, images, and other data or data compilations--stored in any
medium....

(2) to permit entry onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled
by the responding party, so that the requesting party may inspect, measure,
survey. photograph, test, or sample the property or any designated object or
operation on it.
Ft D. R. Cit. P. 34 (a). In addition, Rule 34(b)(2)(D) and (E) provide the scope of the
discoverability of electronic information.
(D) Responding to a Request for Production of Electronically Stored Information. The
response may state an objection to a requested form for producing electronically stored
information. If the responding party objects to a requested form--or if no form was
specified in the request--the party must state the form or forms it intends to use.
(E) Producing the Documents or Electronically Stored Information. Unless otherwise
stipulated or ordered by the court, these procedures apply to producing documents or
electronically stored information:
(i) A party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of
business or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the
request:
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for producing electronically stored
information, a party must produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily
maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms; and
(iii) A party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more
than one form.
FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b)(2)(D)-(E); see also Auto Club Family Ins. Co. v. Abner, No. 05-5723, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63809, at *10-11 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2007) (determining opposing counsel's
objection regarding difficulty of retrieving electronic information insufficient to show undue
burden): Scheindlin & Rabkin. supra note 17, at 356-57 (asserting determination of undue burden
depends on electronic information accessibility).
23 FED. R. CIv. P. 34 advisory committee's notes (2006) ("[Rule 34] is not meant to create a
routine right of direct access to a party's electronic information system .. "); see also Scotts Co.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.. No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *9-10 (S.D. Ohio
June 12, 2007) (citing In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003)) (relying on
2006 Advisory Committee's Note to deny plaintiffaccess to defendant's electronic databases).
24 See Thiclen v. Buongiomo USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8998, at
*8-9 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2007) (permitting restricted access to plaintiffs electronic data by
qualified forensic expert).
21 See 4uto Club Family Ins., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63809, at *11 (declining to
find undue
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Determining the respective burden on each party in producing electronic
materials, such as text messages and pager data, is highly dependent on the
specific facts of each case, resulting in wide variability among the federal
courts. 2

Rule 45(a)(1)(C) specifically addresses third party subpoenas for
the production of electronic materials and applies to both non-electronic
and electronic information.2 ' Though some federal courts have held that
electronic and hard copies of documents are equally discoverable, Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns abound.> Other federal courts have taken
markedly different approaches, including altering the burden of proof
required for a party objecting to an electronic discovery request. 29 Though
the amended Rules sought to avoid such inconsistencies, some30 have
observed the inherent electronic discovery disparities among circuits.
In addition to the Rules, the SCA, which was enacted as a revision
to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 3' provides specific

burden in producing electronic information without sufficient evidence of inaccessibility).
26 See infra Part IV (analyzing inconsistent standards for electronic discovery of
text
messages and pager data).
27 FED R. CIv. P. 45(a)( 1)(C). In relevant part, Rule 45 states:
Combining or Separating a Command to Produce or to Permit Inspection; Specifying
the Form for Electronically Stored Information. A command to produce documents,
electronically stored information, or tangible things or to permit the inspection of
premises may be included in a subpoena commanding attendance at a deposition,
hearing, or trial, or may be set out in a separate subpoena. A subpoena may specify the
form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced.

Id; see also Jonathan 0. Harris, Expert Commentary, E-Discoverv: the Good. the Bad and the
Ug/', I (LcxisNexis May 2008) (on file with journal).
28 See infra note 56 and accompanying text (recounting interplay between Rules and Fourth
Amendment claims); see also Harris, supra note 27, at *3 (noting Federal Rules Advisory
Committee expressed concerns regarding employee privacy).
29 See Auto Club Family Ins., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63809, at *9-10 (holding the objecting
party did not meet heightened burden of proof). "[The objecting party] must make an evidentiary
showing that the data sought is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost." Id. at
*8.
30 See Scotts Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at
*10 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007) (citing Diepenhorst v. City of Battle, No. 1:05-cv-734, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 48551, at *9 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 2006)) (noting dearth of cases addressing
whether opposing counsel may inspect electronically stored information). The "nascent conflict
between electronic privacy laws and communications technology" has led to a marked increase in
electronic surveillance and has rendered electronic discovery "confusing and uncertain."
Frederick M. Joyce & Andrew E. Bigart, Liability tr All, Privac ' fr None: The Contndrtm of
ProtectingPrivacy, Rights in a Pervasiveli' Electronic World, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1481, 1482-83
(2007).
31 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2008) (outlining requirements for private and public entities
seeking to disclose electronic communications including e-mail).
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protections for parties seeking to prevent the discovery of electronic
materials.. 2 The SCA prohibits electronic service providers from releasing
the contents of electronic communications unless the communications fall
into narrow categories and meet specific consent requirements.33
Specifically, the SCA balances an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy against the legitimate public need for the disclosure of information
such as in a criminal investigation.3 4 The SCA often plays a role in
employment cases where an electronic service provider is accused of
wrongfully divulging electronically stored information and incurs criminal
or civil liability. 35 Some observers have argued that case law has done little
to clarify the poorly drafted, ambiguous provisions of the SCA.36
The SCA adds precision to its rules and terminology by dividing
electronic communications into two types: 1) electronic communications
systems (ECS) such as radio and computer devices for active
communication; and 2) remote computing services (RCS) that process and
store electronic communications.3 7 One of the first steps in applying the
32 See Joyce & Bigart, supra note 30, at 1487-91 (arguing revisions to 1986 Electronic
Communications Act balanced electronic discovery policy against efficiency concerns).
33 Id.at 1490-91 (acknowledging SCA prohibits provider from "knowingly divulg[ing] the
contents of a communication while in electronic storage").
Nevertheless, an electronic
communications provider may release such information if the recipient or originator consents. Id.
Generally, most providers use either "phone manager" or forensic tools to recover text message
data, despite the risk of "accidentally" writing data onto a phone in the extraction process.
Wayne Jansen, et al., Overcoming Impediments to Cell Phone Forensics, 41 Annual Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS January 2008), 484, at 2 (on file with
journal). Moreover, deleted text messages are not erased from in the cell phone carrier's system
but rather are typically flagged and may be extricated through forensic proprietary software. Id.
at 3.2.
34 See Joyce & Bigart, supra note 30, at 1485-86 (asserting reasonable expectation of privacy
as foundation to Fourth Amendment and federal communications legislation).
35 See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2008),
(granting plaintiff police officers' motion for judgment as a matter of law) cert. granted, City of
Ontario v. Quon, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 9058 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2009) (No. 08-1332); Flagg v. City of
Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 347 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (declining to find cellular phone service provider
violated SCA); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236-37 (D. Nev. 1996) (vacating
injunction against City and finding no liability under SCA). In Quon, two City of Ontario police
officers sued the service provider of its employee pagers for releasing text message transcripts in
violation of their rights under the SCA and Fourth Amendment. Quon, 529 at 898. The text
messages were the subject of an internal affairs investigation regarding the officers' text
allocation overages. Id. at 897-98. The Ninth Circuit held for the police officers on their Fourth
Amendment, state constitutional, and SCA claims. Id. at 910-11. The United States Supreme
Court accepted the City of Ontario's petition for a writ of certiorari on December 14, 2009. City
of Ontario v. Quon, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 9058 (Dec. 14, 2009) (No. 08-1332).
36 Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide
to Amending It,72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.1208, 1208 (2004) (criticizing SCA's lack of clarity and
noting interpretational difficulties for legislators, reporters, and scholars).
37 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (2008); 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2008).
An "electronic
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SCA is to classify an electronic communication based on its functional use
as an ECS, an RCS, or neither. 38 The SCA's definitions are by no means
bright line, and therefore determining the type of communication system
under the statute is often difficult. 39 Furthermore, the liberal discovery
approach of the Rules and SCA adds another level of complexity to
electronic discovery standards.4 °

After classifying communication as an ECS or an RCS under the
SCA, a court must then determine whether a service provider can release
the communications to a third party. 4'

If a communication is an active

communication device (ECS) rather than mere storage (RCS), then the
provider must acquire the lawful consent of both the subscriber and the
If the provider
intended recipient to release the electronic information.
merely stores electronic information, the service is considered an RCS and
the provider can lawfully release the information if either the sender or the
intended recipient consents.43
Thus, the standard for releasing RCS

communications system," encompasses "any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or
photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any
computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14); see also Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 349 & n. 8 (citing §
2510(14) for ECS definition). In contrast, a "remote computing service" ("RCS"), is defined as
"the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system." 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2008); see also Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 349 & n.7
(citing § 2711(2) for RCS definition).
I See Kerr, supra note 36, at 1215-16 (emphasizing difficulties in classifying both
communication and recipient type); see also infra notes 79, 85-86 (analyzing case law
interpreting variations in ECS and RCS categorization).
39 See Kerr, supra note 36, at 1215-16 (explaining provider can act as an RCS, an ECS, or
neither for the same communications). The provider type depends heavily on the functional
usage of the communication. Id.
40 See i. at 1229-31 (asserting SCA definitional ambiguities regarding applicability to
Internet create compliance difficulties).
41 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2), (b)(3) (categorizing service provider after analyzing SCA definitions)).
Generally, the requirements for an RCS provider to release information to a third party are less
demanding than the standards for an ECS provider because an RCS provider needs only to obtain
the consent of the "subscriber" or the entity contracting with the provider. Id. at 90 1.
42 Id. at 906-07 (reasoning absence of originator and recipient consent violated plaintiffs'
constitutional rights). Generally, the Fourth Amendment protects public employees from
"unreasonable search and seizure in the workplace." Id. at 910.
43 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2008) (enumerating exceptions for disclosure of electronic
communications). A provider may divulge RCS data with "lawful consent of the originator or an
addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the subscriber." Id.; see also Fraser v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment
because email search fell within § 2701(c) exception). In Fraser,the Third Circuit focused on the
fact that the e-mails were stored in the defendant employer's computer system in reasoning that
the provider satisfied § 2701(c). Id. Moreover, the Third Circuit agreed with other circuit courts,
holding that as a requisite matter, a communication must fall under the definition of an
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information is less stringent than the ECS release requirements; this
difference is often at the heart of disputes regarding the release and
discovery of such electronic communications.44 Though these standards
may appear relatively straightforward, they are complicated by several
exceptions to the SCA, which result in further ambiguity and litigation.
The first broad exception allows a service provider to release
stored electronic communications, such as RCS data, to an employee or to
an individual who is incidentally or institutionally authorized to view
them. 46 The second SCA exception permits the service provider to release
stored information if to do so is in the provider's normal course of
business. 47 The SCA also includes several exceptions for valid warrants
and administrative subpoenas. 4' These release requirements depend on the
duration of the infonration storage.49 If a service provider stores text
message data for six months or more, a government entity can utilize
additional means of release authorization, including administrative
subpoenas or court orders.5 0 Finally, if the service provider stores text

"'electronic communication" in order for an unlawful interception to occur under the SCA. Id. at
114. See Joyce & Bigart, supra note 30, at 1490-91 (noting distinctly different standards for ECS
and RCS disclosure).
44 See ini-a Part IV and accompanying text (observing emerging case law trends interpreting
SCA and Rules in context of text message discovery).
45 See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text (identifying federal civil cases
involving text message discovery disputes).
46 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2008); see also Joyce & Bigart, supra note 30, at 1490-91 (citing
IS U.S.C. § 2702(b)) (noting consent exception to SCA allows disclosure to third parties).
47 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (allowing disclosure of electronic materials in provider's
ordinary course of business). The statute defines the ordinary course of business as instances
where the provider "engag[es] in any activity which is necessarily incident to the rendition of
service or to protect the rights ... of the provider." Joyce & Bigart, supra note 30, at 1491 (citing
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5)).
48 Joyce & Bigart, supra note 30, at 1490-91 (observing relaxed release requirements for
electronic communications under government subpoena or administrative order).
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b); see also Joyce & Bigart, sipra note 30, at 1491 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(b)) (explaining broad service provider disclosure conditions for law enforcement officers
seeking to obtain stored data). The SCA distinguishes between information stored for less than
six months and information stored for longer than six months:
Additionally, a service provider must disclose electronic communications to a
governmental entity pursuant to a warrant for communications stored for six months:
for communications stored longer than six months, the service provider must disclose
the communications to a governmental entity with a warrant or if the government
entity provides prior notice to the subscriber and either (1) uses an administrative
subpoena authorized by a federal or state statute or a federal or state grand jury; or (2)
obtains a court order for the disclosure.

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703).
SO Joyce & Bigart, sipra note 30 at 1491 (requiring notice to subscriber in subpoena in
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message or pager information about the commission of a crime or an
impending emergency involving death or serious injury, the provider may
divulge the information regardless of consent. 51 A service provider may
assert these SCA exceptions as defenses to the claims for the unlawful
release of electronic communications.52
These complex definitions lie against the backdrop of the Fourth
Amendment, which plays a crucial role in most claims that have been
brought under the SCA and as part of motions to quash discovery
requests. 53 Based on the legislative record and the ever-increasing role of
electronic communications, the amended Rules and the SCA represent a
recognition of the need for more transparent discovery rules for electronic
materials. 54 The Rules provide the general basis for determining whether
the electronic information is discoverable, and the SCA and its various
exceptions lay out potential defenses to criminal and civil liability for
providers such as cell phone companies. 55 The majority of parties seeking
to suppress cell phone or pager data have argued that releasing the
information would violate their reasonable expectation of privacy implicit
in the Fourth Amendment.56 Some providers inadvertently find themselves

addition to warrant). The governmental entity must also disclose any "inadvertently obtained"
communications to the cellular services provider. Id.
51 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8); see also Joyce & Bigart, supra note 30, at 1491 (detailing
varying consent requirements for lawful divulgence of cell phone data).
2 See Kerr, supra note 36, at 1241 (identifying lack of case law involving criminal
punishment for SCA violations). SCA claims most commonly arise in the civil context rather
than in criminal cases, which further adds to the statute's ambiguity. Id.
53 See Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 389-392 (2009)
(analyzing liability of third-party cellular providers under SCA and Fourth Amendment); see also
infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (outlining vague standards for establishing reasonable
right to privacy embodied in SCA and Fourth Amendment).
54 See supra notes 32-33, 40 and accompanying text (explaining need for revisions to text
message discovery rules).
55 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing enumerated exceptions for
permissible discovery of electronic data).
56 See. e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(advocating use of reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in holding government's electronic
listening device in phone booth violated Fourth Amendment); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating
Co., 529 F.3d 892, 903, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding divulgence of text messages
unconstitutional and in violation of SCA); Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984, 986
(6th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing facts from Bohach and finding production of pager text data
statutorily permitted); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 352 n.14 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(explaining court's attempt to "'implement a protocol that protects against overbroad disclosure of
communications" based on Quon); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1235 (D. Nev.
1996) (finding production of employee pager text messages did not violate employees' Fourth
Amendment rights). But cf Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 109 (3d Cir. 2003)
(allowing discovery of electronic data based on SCA exception criteria); Ideal Aerosmith, Inc. v.
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in legal disputes because they often possess text message or pager data in
which both parties have a strong interest.
III. CONFLICTING CASE LAW REGARDING ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY
In addition to case law involving the Rules and the SCA, Katz v.
United States5" provides well-accepted standards for determining the
bounds of the government's surveillance powers and evaluating a
claimant's reasonable expectation of privacy. 59 The Katz Court laid the
foundation for future courts to reject the premise that a public employee
lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in communication devices
provided by his or her employer. 60 Though Katz was decided decades

Acutronic USA, Inc., No. 07-1029, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33463, at *8-9 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23,
2008) (interpreting SCA absent Fourth Amendment challenge); Auto Club Family Ins. Co. v.
Ahner, No. 05-5723, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63809, at *9-11 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2007) (requiring
production of former insurance agent's electronic data based on Rule 45(c)); Modem Eng'g, Inc.,
v. Peterson, No. 07-CV-1055, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51131, at *6-7 (C.D. Ill.
July 16, 2007)
(allowing in part plaintiff's motion to compel discovery in absence of constitutional claim);
Scotts Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *4-6
(S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007) (basing ruling solely on amended Rules).
57 See, e.g., Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1237 (holding plaintiff employees' text messages
discoverable in lawsuit against City and service provider); Quon, 529 F.3d at 904-06 (concluding
City and service provider violated police officers' reasonable expectation of privacy by releasing
text message data); Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 347 (ruling in camera examination of text message data
proper in plaintiff's suit against employer and service provider).
58 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967).
59 See id.at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (maintaining violations of Fourth Amendment
reasonable expectation of privacy need not involve physical acts). In Katz, the United States
Supreme Court reasoned that an F.B.I. wiretapping procedure violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment Rights and "reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 360-61. Katz and its progeny
have created a formal framework for determining whether an employee has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" through a two-part test that requires "(1) an 'actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy' and (2) an expectation 'that society is prepared to recognized [sic] as
reasonable,' or 'justifiable under the circumstances."' Mindy C. Calisti, You Are Being Watched:
The Need .br Notice in Employer Electronic Monitoring, 96 Ky. L.J. 649, 651 (2007-2008)
(quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). Though the Smith Court established the
majority rule for public employee privacy claims, a minority of jurisdictions continue to maintain
that public employees lack a reasonable expectation of privacy because they do not have a
"possessory interest in the workplace." Id. at 652. It is important to note that although Fourth
Amendment challenges typically must involve a state actor, the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" analysis determines private employees' level of privacy and allows courts to evaluate the
policy reasoning behind the current privacy standards. Id.
60 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-54 (articulating reasonable expectation of privacy analysis based
on First and Fourth Amendments); Quon, 529 F.3d at 904-06 (holding release of text message
data violated employees' reasonable expectation of privacy); see also Herbert, supra note 3, at 57
(2008) (identifying "gap between perception and legal reality" regarding employee privacy).
Generally, privacy rights for employee e-mail and other electronic communications are
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before cell phones and pagers came into common use, the case provided the
necessary basis for subsequent cases holding that a public employee
claiming a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights or his rights under the
SCA must first establish his reasonable expectation of privacy. 6'
In addition to addressing employees' constitutional claims, prior to
the passage of the SCA, federal courts faced complex issues surrounding
the discovery of electronic materials not easily discoverable in hard copy
form.62 In Bohach v. City of Reno,63 the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada focused on the location and nature of the electronic
information in determining whether the text messages stored on city pagers
were discoverable.64
Police officers Bohach and Catalano were the
subjects of an internal affairs investigation in part based on their alleged
abuse of the City's Alphapage system.65 In deciding to apply the stored
electronic information release standard (RCS) rather than the active
electronic transmission rule (ECS), the court focused on the fact that the
City itself was the service provider and allowed easy access to nearly all
employees in its normal course of business. 66 As a preliminary matter, the
court required the officers to prove they had a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" as a basis for their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fourth Amendment
claims. 67 Bohach was one of the earliest cases addressing privacy and
discovery issues in electronic communication device data. 6
Recently,
several courts have relied on the Bohach Court's approach to classifying
electronic communications and determining whether an individual had a
"minimal." Id.
61 See Herbert, supra note 3, at 57 (noting inaccurate perceptions of employee privacy). But
see Calisti, supra note 59, at 652 (noting minority of jurisdictions have declined to recognize
public employees' reasonable expectation of privacy).
62 See Bohach 932 F. Supp. at 1236 (evaluating government disclosure of pager data prior to
passage of SCA and amended Rules); see also Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984
(6th Cir. 2001) (seeking guidance from Bohach opinion several years before amendments to
Rules and SCA); Walden v. City of Providence, 495 F. Supp. 2d 245, 261 (D.R.I. 2007)
(characterizing Adams holding as declining to decide constitutional issue where not absolutely
necessary).
63 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (D. Nev. 1996) (ruling on discoverability of text messages on
employees' pagers).
64 Id. at 1237 (denying plaintiffs' motion to enjoin City of Reno from releasing text message
data).
65 Id. at 1235 (reasoning plaintiffs' expectation of privacy not reasonable in part because
city's central computer system was widely accessible).
66 Id. (noting all members of police department had easy access to electronic pager
information without password).
67 Id. at 1234 (summarizing claimants' civil rights and Fourth Amendment claims resulting
from release of text message data).
68 See cases cited infra notes 95 (observing cases recognizing Bohach as an early leading
case).
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reasonable expectation of privacy.
Though Bohach is a prominent text message data case, the most
often-cited case addressing the discoverability of text messages and pager
data is Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co.70 In holding that the audit of
the plaintiff police officers' cell phones and pagers was improper, the Ninth
Circuit drew an analogy between text messages and e-mail to find that the
officers had a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the precedent in
Katz.7 1 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the transmission of text
messages constituted an ECS, and thus the release of text message
information required the consent of both the subscriber and the intended
recipient. 72 Several courts have acknowledged the scarcity of case law
interpreting the SCA in the electronic discovery context and have looked to
Quon for guidance. 3 Quon has to some extent clarified the ambiguity
surrounding text message discovery, yet new cases are emerging at a rapid
pace that complicate the already inconsistent landscape surrounding text
message discovery standards.74
Though the case law involving text message and pager data is
69 See cases cited injla note 95 (analyzing federal case law citing to Bohach); see also Fraser
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2003) (analogizing Bohach reasoning
to discoverability of employee e-mail). "Like the court in Bohach, we read § 2701(c) literally to
except from Title 11's protection all searches by communications service providers." Id. at 115.
70 529 F.3d 892, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2008); see cases cited in/ra note 96 and accompanying text
(identifying civil cases relying on Quon holding); Miller supra note 5, § 8 (identifying Quon as
leading case for electronic discovery disputes involving text messages).
71 Quon, 529 F.3d at 903-06 (identifying Katz and its progeny as foundational for Fourth
Amendment challenges involving interception of communications).
72 See id. at 900-01 (rejecting lower court's characterization of text messages as RCS data);
Heather Wolnick, Case Summary, The Extension oJ Privac, Rights to the Workplace Text
Messages Under Quon v. Arch Wireless, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351, 357-59 (2009)
(analyzing Ninth Circuit's reasoning regarding ECS/RCS distinction under SCA); supra note 4143 and accompanying text (explaining text message disclosure requirements and exceptions for
ECS and RCS providers).
73 See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., No. C 07-03952 JW, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63115, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2008) (overruling objection to producing
computer server data based on SCA and Quon's distinction between service providers and
interceptors); Hone v. Presidente U.S.A., Inc., No. C08-80071 JF (HRL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55722, at *3-6 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2008) (applying SCA consent exceptions discussed in Quon to
grant plaintiff's motion to quash subpoena of personal e-mail); Ideal Aerosmith, Inc. v. Acutronic
USA, Inc., No. 07-1029. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33463, at *11-14 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2008)
(contrasting facts to Quon to interpret SCA in determining whether reading competitors' stored emails violated trade secret law); see also Joyce & Bigart, supra note 30, at 1495 (extolling Quon
as "one of the most comprehensive discussions" of text message discovery standards); cases cited
infra note 96 (identifying and analyzing recent cases relying on Quon in electronic discovery
disputes).
74 See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 363 & n.29 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (admitting
court was "puzzled" by Quon's application of the facts to SCA); cases cited infra note 96
(summarizing recent cases involving text message discovery disputes that cited to Quon).
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sparse and somewhat limited to employment claims, the jurisprudence in
this area continues to evolve with a keen focus on the active or passive
nature of the service provider.7 5 Recent cases such as Flagg v. City of
Detroit,7 6 demonstrate the importance of electronic discovery to cases in
which an employee alleged violation of federal law and his or her Fourth
Amendment rights based on a cellular service provider's disclosure of text
message data.77 In ruling that the Magistrate Judge could properly examine
the City employees' text message data in camera, the court in Flagg
reasoned that under the amended Rule 34(a), prohibiting such discovery
would run contrary to decades of case law encouraging the open discovery
of relevant materials.7 ' Though the Flagg Court explicitly relied on the
Quon holding, it arrived at an opposite conclusion because it determined
that the communications at issue fell under the RCS definition and
therefore the less stringent consent requirement applied. 79 These discovery
standards remain blurry, and only a handful of relevant civil cases help to
clarify them.8 °
IV. APPLICATION OF SCA AND FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE TO CONFLICTING CASE LAW
Though the SCA assigns criminal liability for disclosing stored
electronic information such as text message data, the Act has been cited
almost exclusively in employment cases.8 1 Moreover, as of 2009, no
federal court has categorically barred the discovery of text messages and
pager data; most courts have taken the liberal approach to discovery
embodied in the Rules.8 2 In general, cases involving the disclosure of
75 See infra Part IV (identifying and discussing patterns in case law); Herbert supra note 3, at
103-04 (noting public employees enjoy greater Fourth Amendment protection than private
employees). Typically, Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to private employers and
this key difference decreases a private employee's expectation of privacy. See id.
76 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
77 Id. at 346-47 (declining to interpret SCA broadly enough to prohibit relevant lawful
discovery).
78 Id. at 347 (emphasizing electronic materials in possession and control of opposing party
are "plainly" subject to discovery).
79 Id. at 359 n.24 (distinguishing ECS and RCS definition rules and emphasizing role of
service provider). In contrast to a situation involving an ECS provider, an RCS provider need
only obtain the consent of either the subscriber or the intended recipient to release the
electronically stored data. Id. at 349-50.
80 See infra Part IV (describing diverging trends in case law involving text message
discovery).
81 See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (observing two distinct case law trends in
discovery of text message and pager data).
82 See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (categorizing federal courts' approaches to
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employee text messages seem to employ solid legal reasoning, yet
a closer
3
look reveals inconsistencies among cases involving similar facts.1
The 2006 Amendments to the Rules embraced pragmatism and
sought to provide adequate guidance for courts ruling on electronic
84
discovery issues.
Due to the liberal nature of the Rules, text message
discovery challenges based on the Rules tend to favor discoverability when
employing both Rules 34 and 45.55 In general, the Rules have8 not
constituted the type of roadblock that many objecting parties may seek. 6
Though case law interpreting standards for discovering text
messages and pager data is in its nascent stages, two distinct trends have
emerged.17 The first group of cases involves public employees filing
claims against public entities based on the SCA and the Fourth
Amendment.88 The second line of cases pertains to private employees

text message discovery based on SCA, Rules, and Fourth Amendment); c Quon v. Arch
Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 903, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining service provider's
release of cell phone data improper due to lack of consent). Though the Ninth Circuit determined
that the release of the plaintiffs' cell phone data violated the Constitution and federal law, the
court noted that "at the time of the search, there was no clearly established law regarding whether
users of text-messages that are archived, however temporarily, by the service provider have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in those messages." Id. at 910.
83 See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 366-67 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (allowing
magistrate judge to inspect public employee's cell phone data). But see Quon, 529 F.3d at 910-11
(holding City's inspection of police officers' text message data violated officers' Fourth
Amendment rights); Justin Conforti, Comment, Somebody's Watching Me: Workplace Privacy
Interests, Technology, Surveillance, and the Ninth Circuit'sMisapplication of the Ortega Test in
Quon v. Arch Wireless, 5 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 461, 467-469 (2009) (asserting Quon
holding indicative of trend of upholding employee privacy in electronic communications).
84 See Marcus, supra note 19, at 330-33 (describing Advisory Committee process for drafting
electronic discovery rules to create acceptable concrete standards).
85 See Thielen v. Buongiorno USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8998, at
*7-9 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2007) (granting defendant's forensic expert access to text message
database using liberal discovery rules); see also Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d
107, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying exception allowing employer to lawfully disclose
employee's communications in finding no SCA violation; Modem Eng'g, Inc. v. Peterson, No.
07-CV-1055, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51131, at *6-7 (C.D. Ill.
July 16, 2007) (requiring defendant
to produce transmitted electronic information including text message data).
86 See Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 354-58, 366-67 (allowing magistrate judge to inspect text data
despite employees' objections based on Rules and SCA).
87 See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (separating text message and pager discovery
disputes into two categories based on discovery objection).
88 See, e.g., Quon 529 F.3d at 910-11 (determining City violated SCA and police officers'
Fourth Amendment rights by releasing text message data); Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250
F.3d 980, 984, 986 (6th Cir. 2001) (declining to rule on Fourth Amendment and federal claims for
monitoring of employee's clone pager); Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 354-58, 366-67 (applying liberal
discovery approach of Rules and granting magistrate judge access to city employee's cell phone
and pager data); Black v. City & County of Honolulu, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1054 (D. Haw.
2000) (denying summary judgment in favor of City due to illegal wiretapping of employee's
pager); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (D. Nev. 1996) (ruling in favor of
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attempting to bar discovery of text message data based on the burden of
discovery standard in the Rules, coupled with privacy concerns.
If these
case law patterns persist, the public and private employee cases will likely
continue to diverge and text message discovery issues will be handled in a
piecemeal fashion until these types of disputes become more
commonplace. 90

A. PublicEmployee Objections to Discovery of Text Message Data
An exhaustive search of the available federal case law regarding
the discoverability of text messages yielded only five civil cases involving
text message discovery disputes with public entities, all of which rely on
precedent from disparate federal courts. 9 1 Interestingly, all five cases
involved an investigation of a public employee's text message use that

precipitated an employee's allegations of an Fourth Amendment or SCA
violation to block the release of text message data by a service provider.9 2
The Bohach case was one of the earliest federal civil cases to rule on
proper disclosure standards for text message data. 93 In finding against the
plaintiff police officers, the Nevada District Court focused on the

provider's role in storing the data and the employees' inability to meet their
burden in showing a reasonable expectation of privacy.94 Several other
cases involving public employees' claims against municipal entities have

defendant that text messages sent by City public employees were discoverable).
89 See, e.g., Fraser, 352 F.3d at 115 (citing SCA exception and ruling defendant private
employer could lawfully disclose employee's electronic communications); Ideal Aerosmith, Inc.
v. Acutronic USA, Inc., No. 07-1029, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33463, at *8-12 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23,
2008) (ruling defendant not bound by SCA disclosure provisions in trade secrets claim involving
private employee e-mail); Modern Eng'g, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51131 at *6-8 (clarifying
specific electronic documents that defendant employee must produce in conjunction with trade
secrets claim); Thielen, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8998 at *7-8 (allowing forensic expert access to
text message and e-mail data relevant to class action lawsuit).
90 See Isom, supra note 1, at
a. I (noting exponential increase in electronic information
necessitating clarification of electronic discovery standards); see also Ideal Aerosnith, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 33463 at *8-9 (observing dearth of cases interpreting SCA).
91 See cases cited supra note 88 and accompanying text (listing public employee text
message discovery disputes); see also Miller, supra note 5, §§ 4-5 (compiling list of criminal and
civil cases involving text message disclosure). Criminal cases comprise the large majority of
cases that involve text message or pager data disputes. Id.
92 See cases cited supra note 88 and accompanying text (analyzing cases in which employees
brought claims against public entities).
93 See Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1235-36 (noting pager system administered entirely by City
render facts distinguishable from other cases).
94 Id. at 1234-35 (asserting officers' low likelihood of success in prevailing on Fourth
Amendment claims); see also Miller supra note 5, § 9 (emphasizing Bohach court found
subjective rather than objective expectation of privacy in its ruling).
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cited directly to Bohach in determining whether text message and pager
data was within the proper scope of discovery.95
Quon is a public employee case with a complex, far-reaching
holding that several federal courts have relied upon in ruling on text
message classification types and release standards. 96 The fact-specific
nature of the claims and the lack of definitive standards for determining
communication provider types under the SCA explain the stark contrast in
policy reasoning between Bohach and Quon.97 Moreover, a majority of
federal cases have cited Bohach or Quon when deciding a substantive issue
of cell phone and pager disclosure. 98
Few cases involving public employee discovery disputes have
drawn upon the Rules, the SCA, and the Fourth Amendment.9 9
Interestingly, in Flagg, the Michigan District Court acknowledged the
Quon holding, yet concluded that Quon's reasonable privacy analysis was
inapplicable because the plaintiff did not assert a Fourth Amendment
claim.100 The conflicting precedent in Quon and Flagg illuminates the
challenges United States District Courts face when confronting text
95 See Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 2001) (relying on Bohach
in analyzing employee's Fourth Amendment claim); Walden v. City of Providence, 495 F. Supp.
2d 245, 260 (D.R.I. 2007) (following Adams approach to Fourth Amendment in denying City's
motion for summary judgment).
96 See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., No. C 07-03952 JW. 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63115, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2008) (citing Quon in analyzing SCA distinction
between intercepting electronic data and providing communications and storage); Hone v.
Presidente U.S.A., Inc., No. C08-80071 JF (HRL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55722, at *3-6 (N.D.
Cal. July 21. 2008) (citing Quon in applying SCA's ECS and RCS consent exceptions).
97 Compare Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2008)
(noting
defendant city had informal policy allowing for public disclosure of personal data), with Bohach
932 F. Supp. At 1234-35 (vitiating reasonable expectation of privacy claim based on public
accessibility to electronic pager data). The Quon court also distinguished the level of privacy
protection applicable to the claimants' e-mail and computer files from stored text and pager data.
Quon. 529 F.3d at 902-03. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Oakland Police Department had a
formal written policy warning against public disclosure of e-mail and computer files but no
formal policy on pager data disclosure. Id. at 897; see also Miller supra note 5, § 8 (asserting
cases such as Quon "appealed to broad societal norms" in evaluating reasonable expectation of
privacy).
9" See supra notes 95-96 (observing two cases discussing Bohach and two cases citing to
Quon).
99 See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 361-63 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (combining
disclosure standards of Rules and SCA consent rules for RCS providers). The district court's
creative approach forged a compromise authorizing a magistrate judge to review the text message
data in camera. Id. at 362-63.
'0' Id. at 351 & n.13 (relying on Quon to conclude that text message data is narrowly
discoverable). The Flagg court also declined to adopt Quon's Fourth Amendment reasoning in
finding the text message data subject to discovery. Id. However, the court later noted that Quon
aligns with its effort to "implement a protocol that protects against overbroad disclosure of
[employee] communications." Id. at 352 n. 14.
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message disclosure issues for the first time given that the decisions of other
federal courts are merely persuasive rather than precedential. ""
Furthermore, federal courts face a dearth of case law interpreting the Rules
in the context of SCA claims, which results in creative solutions that may
be workable
for the case at bar, yet too case-specific to provide future
2
10

guidance.

B. PrivateEmployee Claims Against PrivateEntities
The claims of a private employee objecting to the disclosure of text
message data are inherently distinct from the claims of a public employee,
yet private employers confront similar challenges with regard to text
message disclosure.10 3 Indeed, despite the inherent differences, several
private employment cases have relied on Quon and Bohach in an effort to
find clarity. 10 4 There are fewer private employment cases involving
objections to text message disclosure than public employment cases, which
largely rely on the Rules to resolve discovery disputes rather than the SCA
or the Fourth Amendment." 5
Another potential trend in text message and pager data
jurisprudence is the tendency of courts to reason by analogy to e-mail and

I1 See Ideal Aerosmith, Inc. v. Acutronic USA, Inc., No. 07-1029, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

33463, at *8-9 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2008) (noting scarcity of civil case law addressing preemption
in electronic discovery).
102 See Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 362-63 (entrusting magistrate judge with review of text message
communications).
103 See Herbert, supra note 3, at 51 ("The integration of employer computers with personal
electronic communication devices is creating complex legal issues regarding the balance between
employee and employer rights and legal responsibilities."); see also Joyce & Bigart, supra note
30, at 1481 (noting cell phones and e-mail have become "ubiquitous" in modem society).
104 See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2003)
(analogizing case to Bohach holding regarding service provider exception for electronically
stored text data); Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., No. C 07-03952 JW, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63115, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2008) (following Qoon approach of
distinguishing service provider from interceptor of publicly available communications); Hone v.
Presidente U.S.A., Inc., No. C08-80071 JF (HRL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55722, at *3-4 (N.D.
Cal. July 21, 2008) (applying Quon test to define service provider type under SCA); Ideal
Aerosmith, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33463, at *10-13 (engaging in lengthy discussion of Quon
preemption reasoning).
105 See, e.g., Auto Club Family Ins. Co. v. Ahner, No. 05-5723, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63809, at *9-11 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2007) (relying on Rules 34 and 45 to compel defendant to
produce electronic information); Modem Eng'g, Inc. v. Peterson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51131,
at *6-8 (C.D. Ill. July 16, 2007) (looking exclusively Rule 34 in resolving electronic discovery
dispute); Thielen v. Buongiomo USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8998, at *46 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2007) (citing only to Rules in allowing limited discovery of plaintiffs
electronic communication devices).
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telephone recordings. 01° '
The cases that have arisen outside of the
employment law context seem to focus almost exclusively on the Rules in
resolving text message discovery disputes, as do cases involving e-mail and
electronic wiretapping.'0 7 Based on the modem trend towards increased
cell phone and text message use in the workplace and in private life, the
need for definitive discovery standards persists. 0 8
C. Trendy in Application of SCA Definitions in Text Message Cases and
Implications or FourthAmendment Claims
The majority of text message discovery disputes in federal court
have involved claims of civil liability under the SCA against an adverse or
third party service provider.' 0 9 Though the legislative intent of the SCA
was to protect citizen's electronic communications privacy through
criminal penalties and civil liability, the Act has been mired by inconsistent
applications of the consent standards for ECS and RCS providers." 0
Determining the lawfulness of releasing stored text message or pager data
often turns on whether the court categorized the service provider as an RCS
or an ECS. l t However, rather than analyze factual situations according to
provider type within the RCS and ECS framework of the SCA, many courts
have employed unique terminology outside the SCA's statutory definitions
including "interceptor" and "provider.""11 2 The use of these terms instead of

1116 See. e.g., Scotts Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43005, at *4-9 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007) (relying on e-mail discovery precedent to resolve
motion to compel electronic inforiation including text messages); Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63115, at *3-4 (requiring defendant to produce website transactions pertaining
to offers to sell counterfeit goods); Hone, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55722, at *3-6 (applying e-mail
implications of Rule 45 and Quon in granting plaintiffs motion to quash).
107 See cases cited supra note 105 and accompanying text (identifying discovery disputes
pertaining to text messages outside public employment context).
101 See spra note 103 and accompanying text (noting prominent role of electronic
communications and cell phones in modem life).
109 See generallv Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529
F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2008);
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 109 (3d Cir. 2003); Adams v. City of Battle
Creek. 250 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2001); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 347 (E.D.
Mich. 2008); Louis Vnitton Malletier, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63115, at *1-2; Hone, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 55722, at *1-2; IdealAe-osmnith, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33463, at *1-2.
ii) See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (explaining ECS and RCS definitions and
varying consent requirements).
iii See, e.g., Quon, 529 F.3d at 901 (illustrating differences between ECS and RCS
standards); Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 349 (emphasizing ECS and RCS distinction in determining
properness of disclosure); Hone, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55722, at *2 (concluding defendant
Yahoo! functioned as ECS and was thus subject to heightened consent standard).
112 See, e.g., Adams, 250 F.3d at 982-83 (exploring definitions of"intercept" within statutory
context); Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 364 (holding RCS provider may intercept communications with

162

SUFFOLK JOURNAL OF TRIAL

& APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XV

the precise language of the SCA creates yet another potentially contentious
question of fact for parties to litigate." 3 Though the "provider" and
"interceptor" terms seem less technical and understandable to those
unfamiliar with the statute, these
deviations exacerbate the SCA's
4
ambiguities and inconsistencies.''
In addition to the unpredictable application of the SCA terms,
Fourth Amendment claims provide another analytical twist in the
meandering path towards resolving text message discovery disputes. 1 5 Of
the claimants that relied on the SCA to prevent the disclosure of text
information, roughly half of them asserted a Fourth Amendment claim
based on the actions of a state actor or a private entity carrying out a public
function." 6 Though the constitutional case law on text message disclosure
is relatively sparse, the federal courts have relied on stare decisis to quickly
dispense with a Fourth Amendment claim.'1 7 The SCA's protections
against the unlawful search and seizure of electronic communications are
more extensive than the rights embodied in the Fourth Amendment, which
partially explains this trend in the case law."' Furthermore, a party seeking

consent of one or more intended recipients); Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63115, at *3.4 (asserting interception of publicly available documents did not create liability
under SCA); see also Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113-14 (recounting history of term "intercept" in
federal communications law). In addition to the case law interpreting the SCA's definition of
"intercept," numerous cases have also explored the definition of "intercept" under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2008). See id.
113 Fraser, 352 F.3d at 115 (concluding release of employee's electronically stored data
lawful without applying ECS and RCS consent standards); Adams, 250 F.3d at 986 (determining
production of pager data proper irrespective of ECS and RCS distinctions); Louis Vuitton
Malletier, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63115, at *3-4 (discussing provider and interceptor distinction
independent of ECS and RCS consent requirements).
114 See Quon, 529 F.3d at 906 ("We do not endorse a monolithic view of text message users'
reasonable expectation of privacy, as this is necessarily a context-sensitive inquiry.").
115 See supra notes 56, 58-60 and accompanying text (summarizing Fourth Amendment
claims in text message and pager data cases).
116 Compare Quon, 529 F.3d at 910-11 (asserting service provider violated SCA by releasing
employees' text message data during internal affairs investigation), with supra notes 56, 58-60
and accompanying text (identifying common arguments in Fourth Amendment challenges to
production of text message and pager data).
117 See Adams, 250 F.3d at 986 (denying constitutional claims and noting parties did not
argue SCA protections differed from Fourth Amendment); Walden v. City of Providence, 495 F.
Supp. 2d 245, 261 (D.R.I 2007) (declining to rule on Fourth Amendment claims where not
absolutely necessary). But see Quon, 529 F.3d at 910-11 (finding release of police officers' text
message data violated both U.S. and California constitutions).
118 See Ideal Aerosmith, Inc. v. Acutronic USA, Inc., No. 07-1029, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33463, at *4-16 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2008) (engaging in lengthy discussion of SCA preemption).
The Pennsylvania District Court in Ideal Aerosmith emphasized that its reasoning was consistent
with the Ninth Circuit in Quon because the SCA did not preempt state communications law
through conflict, express, or field preemption. Id. at *13 & n.2.
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to prevent the disclosure of text message data has an arsenal of defenses
including the Rules, federal statues, the United States Constitution, and
state constitutions to protect his or her interests amidst the unpredictable
landscape of electronic discovery disputes. " 9
VI. CONCLUSION
As text messages become integral to personal and workplace
comrnmunication, cases challenging production of text message data based
on the Rules, the SCA, and the Fourth Amendment will become
increasingly prevalent. In particular, employment cases will continue to
provide fruitful grounds for litigation involving text message disclosure.
Case law regarding text messages is largely undeveloped, leaving an
expansive canvas upon which future courts may craft the jurisprudence in
this area. Furthermore, several federal courts have noted that the myriad
ambiguities in this area will continue to plague electronic discovery
disputes until an adequate body of case law emerges.
The ECS and RCS disclosure standards, in the context of SCA,
provide a modicuir of guidance to courts faced with text message
discovery disputes, yet in practice, the ECS and RCS definitions are overly
broad. Revisions to § 2701 of the SCA, specifically applying to text
messages and other electronically stored information such as metadata,
would ameliorate some of these inconsistencies. For example, provisions
differentiating e-mail and text message disclosure consent standards would
help to guide litigators encountering these issues for the first time.
Moreover, given that the SCA was initially intended to prescribe criminal
liability for unauthorized disclosure of electronically stored information,
the statute's almost exclusive application in civil employment disputes
demonstrates a fundamental disconnect between the statute's purpose and
its impact. Clarity can only be achieved through legislative revision until
more robust case law or legislation develops.
Along with revisions to the SCA, adopting official comments to
Rules 26, 34, and 45, addressing the scope of issues relating to the
discovery of text messages would provide much needed guidance. Third
parties such as cellular service providers are often named as parties to
lawsuits involving improper text message disclosure even though they had
no involvement in the underlying action. Therefore, clarifying the scope of
discovery and the proper role of entities storing contested electronic

119 See supra notes 4, Error! Bookmark not defined.-89, 101, and accompanying text
(exposing dearth of federal case law regarding text message discovery).
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information has the potential to avoid third party uncertainty and expense.
In sum, Congress must provide relevant workable guidelines to ensure that
text message discovery disputes are resolved efficiently, consistently, and
fairly. Though uniform discovery standards may be unattainable in the
short term, federal courts will likely continue to rely on a handful of
seminal cases in confronting this new horizon of electronic discovery.
Erin Marie Secord

